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I. Introduction 
 
American adults usually live with other adults.  While many of these are spouses, 
many others are not.  Marriage and its relation to choices of fertility, work, and welfare 
receipt have been widely studied (among recent work, see Moffitt 1990; Schultz 1994; 
Moffitt et al. 1995a), yet little research has focused on nonmarital cohabitation.  In recent 
years it has received increasing attention for two reasons.  First, as the age at first 
marriage rises, the age of first union rises much less—more couples are cohabiting before 
marriage (Bumpass and Sweet 1989).  Evidence shows that these premarital unions are 
last a shorter time than marriages (Teachman et al. 1991), but regardless, a society 
interested in marriage or in stable unions would be interested in the determinants of 
cohabitation if it plays a role in the probability of marriage or of stable unions.  Another 
reason for renewed attention is the finding that state AFDC programs vary in their 
treatment of cohabitors' contributions toward the expenses of AFDC recipients.  State 
legislators concerned about cohabitation or welfare expenditures would gain from 
knowing how public policies are affecting cohabitation in practice.   
The Family Support Act of 1988 required that the AFDC-UP program be 
available in every state by the end of 1990, on the premise that it would lessen the 
incentive for poor women to avoid marriage.   From this we may conclude that federal 
legislators are interested in poor women’s marriage patterns, and further that they will 
consider using welfare policies to alter them.  On the assumption that state legislators act 
similarly, one may discuss the impact of welfare program generosity and regulations in 
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light of how a legislator might use them to encourage marriage, discourage single 
motherhood, or give some other incentive. 
 This paper presents a multinomial logit model of a woman's major options: not 
cohabiting, cohabiting with a spouse and possibly others, or cohabiting with others but 
not with a spouse.  Because cohabitation has the possibility of alleviating poor women's 
need for public assistance, I investigate the connection between state welfare policies and 
the cohabitation choice.  The analysis moves beyond the typical measure of welfare 
generosity--the monthly benefit level--to include two sets of state welfare regulations that 
affect how cohabitors' contributions to household expenditures may affect the woman's 
welfare benefit.  The use of Census data allows sufficient sample sizes for separate 
estimation for White and Black women.   
I find that many personal and state variables substantially alter the choice of 
cohabitation, but welfare programs generally do not.  The strongest impact of welfare 
programs falls on the choice of marriage, where I find support for the theory that more 
generous AFDC payments should be associated with fewer marriages.  Although the 
patterns vary by race, the results reveal that other welfare policies do not exert a strong 
influence on women's choice of cohabitation and marriage.    
 
 II.  Previous Research 
 
There are a number of reasons why women might want to cohabit nonmaritally.1  
                                                          
1 For the sake of this discussion I will use the term 'premarital' to refer to unmarried man-woman couples. 
Of course many such pairs have no intention of marrying, but I am  following the terminology used by 
other researchers.  The broader term 'nonmarital' denotes all cohabiting groups except married couples; this 
would include unmarried sisters sharing an apartment, for example.    
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 First, cohabitation may lead to economies of household expenditure on rent, food, 
utilities, or other matters.  Haurin et al. (1993) and Ermisch and DiSalvo (1997), for 
example, find that the likelihood of a young adult leaving the parental home depends on 
the direct costs of living apart, such as housing.  If shared apartments are cheaper than 
living alone, cohabitation would make separation from parents more viable.  Second, 
cohabitors may enable the woman to work more if they provide childcare to her children 
(Blau and Robins 1989; Parish et al. 1991).  Stack (1974) detailed how poor Blacks rely 
on a considerable network of kin for income insurance.  Cohabitation may also provide 
income to replace or supplement that provided by those outside the household. 
 Cohabitation has a complex relation to welfare programs.  By supplementing 
household income, a working cohabitor may reduce or eliminate a family's need (and 
eligibility) for welfare programs (Hill 1990).  Alternatively, it may enable a woman to 
receive unreported supplements to welfare payments with low risk of detection by public 
officials.  Such unreported income is common, as Edin (1991) found when analyzing the 
budgets of dozens of Chicago welfare recipients.  Almost all relied from time to time on 
unreported income, including cash payments from family and current or former partners. 
Finally, specific state laws on the treatment of cohabitors' contributions to AFDC 
recipients may encourage the import or export of household members in order to 
maximize welfare benefits (Wolf 1984).  Section III below discusses these laws in more 
detail.   
From a social viewpoint, couples may consider cohabitation a proving ground 
before a potential marriage, or instead a substitute for it.   Finally, premarital cohabitation 
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may simply be a matter of convenience that does not signal the relationship's quality 
(Teachman et al. 1991). 
Relevant studies of cohabitation can be divided into two groups: demographic and 
economic.  The former are mostly concerned with the number and duration of cohabiting 
households, especially among couples (i.e., premarital unions).   These include Bumpass 
and Sweet (1989) and Teachman et al. (1991), which look at the stability of premarital 
versus marital unions over time; Bumpass and Raley (1994), which considers how 
premarital cohabitation affects the duration of unmarried motherhood; and Manning 
(1992), which studies the link between premarital cohabitation and premarital fertility. 
Economic studies have focused on the determinants of entry into premarital or 
marital cohabitation, or on the transition from premarital cohabitation to marriage or 
dissolution of the union.   Such studies include Smock and Manning (1997), which 
investigates how the economic characteristics of each partner affect the likelihood of 
transition to marriage, and Winkler (1994), which studies how AFDC benefits and 
various state characteristics affect the probability of being married or being a household 
head.  Goldscheider and DaVanzo (1989) investigate how the child's and parents' 
circumstances affect the child's transition from the parental household to group living, 
marriage, or other arrangements. 
Two studies take advantage of recent findings on state AFDC programs' treatment 
of cohabitors' contributions to AFDC families, information first published by Hutchens, 
Jakubson and Schwartz (1989) and recently updated by Moffit et al. (1995b).  The first is 
Moffitt et al. (1995a), which uses the PSID and NLSY separately to study the impact of 
AFDC benefits on cohabitation and marital status.  The authors estimate a multinomial 
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logit model with three choices for a woman: household head, premarital cohabitation, and 
marriage.  Using PSID data, they find higher welfare benefits to be associated with fewer 
marriages and cohabitations among mothers aged 18-55.  A similar model with NLSY 
data yields a negative coefficient for the married state but a positive (yet insignificant) 
coefficient for cohabitation.  Their study has the drawback of not accounting for the link 
between fertility and household composition.  By limiting the sample to mothers of minor 
children they omit nulliparous women, though this group is also of policy interest.  
Second, the independent variables include the number of children under 18 and under 6.  
These variables may be correlated with the unexplained error in the household 
composition model and thus endogenous to the choice of household composition. 
The second paper is Hu (1997), which also assesses the impact of AFDC benefits 
on the likelihood of premarital cohabitation and of marriage.  His data are from a 
California AFDC experiment in which randomly assigned treatment and control groups 
faced different welfare benefit levels.  The author limits the sample to mothers who are 
former welfare recipients.  He also estimates a multinomial logit model of household 
composition, employing the same as Moffit et al. (1995a).   Although AFDC benefits are 
found to have a negative impact on the likelihood of marriage or premarital cohabitation, 
the significance levels are not reported.  The author then estimates a second model with 5 
choices: single, cohabit with a nonfather (i.e., not the father of her child), cohabit with a 
father, marry a nonfather, or marry a father.  The results show "no consistent effect of 
welfare benefit levels on the likelihood of marriage relative to cohabitation."  Like 
Moffitt et al. (1995a), Hu's paper limits the sample to women in premarital (rather than 
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nonmarital) unions.  And the author's focus on mothers who have received welfare in the 
past may limit the external validity of the results. 
Both papers limit their definition of cohabiting couples to those with one man and 
one woman.  While premarital unions are of policy interest due to their potential 
substitutability for marriage, the incentives for cohabitation listed above apply nearly 
equally to all nonmarital cohabitants.  This paper studies the broader issue of the 
determinants of nonmarital cohabitation, investigating how AFDC rules on cohabitors' 
contributions affect a woman's choice to live with other adults. 
The next section reviews the AFDC program and its associated policies, as well as 
a number of other relevant public aid programs. 
 
III.  Review of Welfare Programs 
 
 Most studies of welfare focus on AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid.  Each of 
these has the potential to affect a woman's housing choice by creating a financial 
incentive concerning fertility or marital status.  In this study I extend the investigation 
beyond these three programs to include a number of federal and state anti-poverty 
programs that may also alter women's choices.  This section provides a brief overview of 
each. 
 
AFDC
 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is the primary means-tested 
income-support program for poor mothers and their children.  It is jointly funded by the 
state and federal governments.  Each state's funding share determined by its relative per-
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capita income, with an upper limit of 50 percent.  The unit of assistance is the family, 
defined as one or more children under age 18 in a household that meets certain income 
and asset limits.  These limits are determined federally, but the states have wide 
discretion to determine the monthly payment level.  Participation in AFDC confers 
categorical eligibility in several others programs, including Food Stamps, Medicaid, and 
federal housing assistance provided under LIHEAP, as well as income eligibility for 
WIC.  Over time AFDC has been recast as a welfare-to-work program rather than simply 
an income-maintenance program.  The Family Support Act of 1988 required every state 
to implement a combination of education, training, and supported work activities that 
would move recipients off the welfare rolls.   
Although the primary recipients are families consisting of an unwed mother and 
one or two children, married-couple families and nulliparous pregnant women are also 
covered.  Marriage does not disqualify a woman per se, but rather marriage to the father 
of any of her coresident dependent children.  These are the "two-parent" families.  If the 
woman married (or cohabited with) a man who was not the father of any such children, 
she was still eligible for AFDC.  There are two general exceptions.  In seven states,  
stepfathers are counted as fathers for the sake of determining benefits.   Additionally, 
every state allows otherwise-eligible, two-parent families to obtain AFDC if one parent is 
sufficiently disabled. 
 A 1996 law replaced AFDC with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF).  Aside from ending the program's entitlement status and moving it to block-
grant funding, the law provides states with greater flexibility in spending the federal grant 
than was available under AFDC.  
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AFDC-UP 
 The Aid to Families with Dependent Children - Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP)  
program serves married and cohabiting two-parent families that otherwise meet the  
requirements of the main AFDC program.  It has the same funding system and income 
and asset requirements as AFDC.  One parent is deemed the 'primary earner' and must be 
currently unemployed, defined as working no more than 100 hours per month.  The 
primary earner must also show a history of labor-force attachment.  Until 1990, the 
program was optional and had never been offered by more than 30 states.  The 1988 
Family Support Act mandated AFDC-UP coverage in every state as of September, 1990.  
By the mid-1990s, many states had obtained waivers of the 100-hour rule for intrastate 
welfare experiments.   
Food Stamps
 The Food Stamp program provides coupons for food purchases.  Counties 
administer the program under the oversight of state governments and the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture.  The federal government fully funds Food Stamps and sets 
requirements for income, assets, and work.  Gross household income must fall below 130 
percent of the poverty line and net income below 100 percent (except households with 
elderly or disabled members).  Countable resources cannot exceed $2000, or $3000 if the 
household includes someone over 60, and assets include the equity in a vehicle beyond a 
preset limit.  Participants must work or agree to participate in work-training or job-search 
efforts.  The benefit varies by household size, where household is defined as an 
individual or group of individuals who "customarily purchase food and prepare meals 
together for home consumption."  Related family members living together are 
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automatically counted as one unit regardless of their actual food preparation habits, 
unless one person is elderly or disabled.  People living in institutions and boarding houses 
are not eligible.  
LIHEAP: Federal Energy Assistance
The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) provides grants to 
defer the cost of home heating, cooling, and weatherization.  The unit of assistance is the 
household, defined in statute as "any individual or group of individuals who are living 
together as one economic unit for whom residential energy is customarily purchased in 
common or who make undesignated payments for energy in the form of rent."  Recipients 
of AFDC and Food Stamps are eligible, as are households with incomes no greater than 
110 percent of the state poverty level or 60 percent of the median state income.  At their 
option states may raise the upper income limit to 150 percent of the poverty level.  States 
may also add other restrictions, such as asset tests and limitations for people living in 
subsidized housing or group living arrangements.  Payments come in the form of cash, 
two-party checks, vouchers, or direct payments to energy suppliers.    
AFDC Policies on Cohabitors’ Income Contributions
 Following Moffitt et al. (1995a; 1995b) I distinguish among three state policies 
regarding the treatment of cohabitors' income.  For every state, a regular cash 
contribution to the woman's family is treated like earned income.  Suppose that a 
cohabitor pays part of the family's housing cost.  Under Policy A, the AFDC grant is not 
reduced.  Under Policy B, the AFDC grant is reduced by the amount of the shelter 
allowance (a portion of the total grant) unless the woman also contributes toward her 
family's housing costs.  If she contributes even $1, she will receive the full AFDC grant.  
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Under Policy C, the AFDC grant is reduced by the full shelter allowance less the amount 
that the woman herself contributes. 2   
Using PSID data, Moffitt et al. (1995a) find that, relative to Policy C, a dummy 
variable signifying policy A had a large, positive effect on the probability of cohabitation 
outside of marriage.  This conclusion held for both welfare recipients and non-recipients.  
The impact on the latter group could be spurious, but it could also reflect optimizing 
behavior on the part of women who may later become recipients. 
While there is a similar effect in NLSY data for those receiving welfare, the effect 
drops more than 80 percent for those cohabiting but not on welfare.  A dummy variable 
for states with policy B had a similar effect, which is expected since the two policies are 
almost identical in practice.  Overall, then, the authors find that the disregards for shelter 
contributions in policies A and B substantially increase the probability of cohabitation 
outside of marriage. 
 Their survey of state policies also addressed the treatment of cash contributions to 
the AFDC family.  Three questions were asked about how welfare agencies determine 
family income:  
* Do they disregard contributions for shared housing expenses other than rent?  
* Do they disregard unpredictable contributions? 
* Do they disregard $30 in gift income per quarter? 
 The remaining columns of Appendix A show the treatment of cash contributions, 
by state.  Fifty states (including D.C.) disregard at least one of the three sources, and 
forty-three disregard two.  Only seven states disregard all three.   
                                                          
2 That is, the woman receives {Total Grant – (Shelter Allowance – Own Contribution)}.  See column (4) of 
Appendix A for a list of each state’s policy. 
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 These regulations are similar to policies A-C in that the income may come from 
cohabitors.  There are two differences.  First, policies A-C cover contributions toward 
housing costs only, while the others concern income used for any purpose.  Second, 
penalties under policies B and C would reduce the AFDC shelter allowance (part of the 
entire grant) dollar for dollar, regardless of the woman's other income.  Penalties under 
the other policies would increase the woman's total countable income, thereby potentially 
reducing her total AFDC grant.  An example will illustrate the second distinction.  
Consider a woman living in a state that had Policy C and which did not disregard money 
from cohabitors going toward shared household expenses.  If a cohabitor contributed $50 
per month toward the rent, under policy C the woman's shelter allowance would be 
reduced by $50.  If the cohabitor instead contributed $50 toward other household 
expenses, the woman's countable income would rise by $50.  This would only reduce her 
AFDC grant to the extent that her countable income rose above a state-mandated income 
limit.    
 
IV.  Patterns of Women’s Cohabitation 
 
Households exhibit many different arrangements, such as married couples with 
children; unrelated, childless adults cohabiting nonmaritally; a single mother living with 
her parents and her child; and many others.   When considering how to classify them into 
a manageable number of groups, a natural first distinction is this: women who live with 
other adults versus women who do not.   This constitutes the choice of cohabitation in the 
broadest sense.   But a woman’s household composition includes both a decision about 
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marriage and a separate decision of whether to live with adults in addition to her husband.  
By lumping together married and unmarried women, the binary view may mask the true 
effect of factors affecting the probability of marriage, such as welfare benefit levels. 3   
A better model would allow marriage and nonmarital cohabitation to be affected 
differentially by explanatory variables.  These two decisions--marry or not, and cohabit 
with other adults or do not—have four permutations, suggesting a four-way model.    In 
order to clarify the choice between marriage and cohabitation, I will put all married 
women's households in one group, regardless of the presence of cohabiting adults.  Thus 
three groups remain: married women, with or without other adults (the ‘married’); 
unmarried women who cohabit with other adults (the ‘cohabitors’); and unmarried 
women who do not cohabit with other adults (the ‘lone women’).4  Note that cohabitation 
does not imply any type of relationship between cohabitors; it could include two adult 
sisters living together, for example, as well as a woman living with her unmarried 
partner.   
 Each of the three choices could be split into two: one with children and one 
without.  Fertility may be decided jointly with marriage, cohabitation, and work decisions 
over a multiyear horizon.  Because there are no uncontroversial exogenous variables to 
identify the fertility choice, it will not be treated separately.  Each category will include 
both women with children and those without.  The clearest drawback is that AFDC and 
                                                          
3 Here and elsewhere in this paper, a ‘married’ woman is one who lives with her husband.  Women who 
report being married-with-spouse-absent are always counted as ‘unmarried’ in my discussions and 
analyses. 
 
4 Note that lone women are a subset of the frequently used 'female household heads.'  The latter group 
includes any household with an unmarried (or married, spouse absent) woman and no unmarried adult 
male.  The woman could live with another adult woman, or even with a married couple, and still be a 
female household head.  In my terminology, 'lone adult' means the woman is only adult in the household.  
All instances of nonmarital cohabitation count as cohabitation.   
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AFDC-UP are only available to women with children.  Splitting the parents and 
nonparents would reveal the fertility effect more clearly. 
 Proportions of American women in the married and cohabiting categories are 
shown in the top section of Table 1.  The data, described in the next section, come from 
the 1990 U.S. Census and include women from every state and the District of Columbia.  
The difference in household composition across races is considerable.  Among those ages 
18-49, cohabiting women constitute 28.6 percent of Whites but 54.9 percent of Blacks, 
roughly double the level of Whites.  This is mirrored in the ‘married’ category, which 
applies to 64.0 percent of Whites but only 36.7 percent of Blacks.   Breaking those 
figures down into two age groups, 18-29 and 30-49, we see that while three-fourths of 
Whites aged 30-49 are married, the corresponding figure for Blacks is just under one-
half.  The difference is not in the ‘lone’ category, which applies to fewer than one in ten 
women of either race.  Rather, Blacks are substituting cohabitation for marriage to a 
much greater extent than Whites.    
 In this paper I hypothesize that welfare benefits and regulations may alter the 
proportion of married and cohabiting women.  To give a sense of the relative proportions 
of marriage and cohabitation among those likely to receive welfare, Table 1 also includes 
data from Hu (1997) and Moffitt et al. (1995a), both of which consider the household 
composition of former welfare recipients.  Section II of Table 1 shows the proportions 
from Hu’s sample of California women participating in a welfare demonstration program.  
Not surprisingly, women who received AFDC in late 1992 were quite unlikely to be 
married when interviewed 10-21 months later.  Likewise, those receiving AFDC-UP in 
late 1992 were likely to be married during the same period.  Section III shows Moffitt et 
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al.’s data from four separate national surveys, focusing on women who received AFDC 
during the previous year.  Again the rates of marriage are much lower than in the Census 
sample of all women.   
 Both papers also tally the proportion of “cohabiting” women, which they define 
as an unmarried woman living with an unmarried man whom she identifies as her 
‘partner.’5  The Moffitt et al. data reveal a consistent proportion of unmarried man-
woman cohabitation among former welfare recipients of  8.3-9.2 percent.  The proportion 
is notably higher among younger women, 16.9 percent of former welfare recipients in the 
NLSY.  Hu finds a similar figure for former AFDC-UP recipients (17.6 percent) but less 
than half as many among former AFDC recipients (8.2 percent). 
 Although the definitions of cohabitation vary across surveys, the sources cited in 
Table 1 show that marriage and cohabitation rates vary significantly by age and race.  
There is also substantially less marriage among former welfare recipients than among all 
women together, although the cause is not clear, suggesting that welfare programs and 
regulations could be affecting the proportion of women in these categories.   
 
 V. Data 
 
In order to obtain sample sizes sufficient to identify each state and the District of 
Columbia, I use data drawn from the 1990 decennial Census.  The sample is a 1-in-5 
                                                          
5 This definition of cohabitation is much narrower than my own.  My data source is the University of 
Minnesota’s IPUMS (Ruggles and Sobek 1997), an online archive and access system for Census data.  The 
extensive set of family relations provided by IPUMS does not include the presence of an unmarried partner 
in the household.  This precludes a separate analysis of women living with unmarried partners as done by 
Hu or Moffitt et al.   
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extract from the 5% Metropolitan PUMS, including White and Black women ages 18-
49.6  The samples are nationally representative without the use of weights.  Information 
on government programs comes mostly from the 1991 'Green Book' (U.S. House of 
Representatives 1991).   
 Descriptive statistics, definitions, and additional sources are given in Appendix B.  
Part B.1 shows the total sample means and standard deviations for each variable by race, 
with definitions and sources provided in B.2.  Part B.3 contains the average benefit level 
of selected welfare programs by state.  Appendix C gives the zero-order correlation 
matrix of the data. 
 The Black and White samples have some notable differences, as illustrated in 
Table 2.  The table breaks down several key variables by race and cohabitation category.  
The first, age, reveals little difference across races.  Lone and married women are of 
similar ages, while cohabiting women are 5-7 years younger on average.  The difference 
is sharper in education, where we see that Blacks have less education on average than 
Whites.  Across races, cohabiting women are roughly 30 percent more likely to lack a 
high school diploma or GED than are married women, and 50 percent more likely than 
lone women.  Lone women of both races are the best educated, with more than 60 percent  
of both groups have at least some college education.  Married women are somewhat less 
likely to be college educated, and cohabiting women even less likely.  Moffitt et al. 
(1995b) also find marriage and cohabitation rates to vary with education among former 
welfare recipients.  Women with less than a high school education are more likely to be 
                                                          
6See Ruggles and Sobek (1997) for details of the 5% and 1% samples.  All Census measures are self-
reported. 
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married and less likely to cohabit with an umarried male partner than are other women in 
the CPS and NSFH surveys, although oddly the opposite patterns occur in the PSID.7
 The most commonly studied welfare policy variable has been the monthly 
maximum AFDC benefit.  It varies little across groups for Whites.  There is a noticeable 
difference across groups for Blacks, however, suggesting that AFDC benefits may be 
affecting the marital choice of Blacks more than that of Whites.  The relatively small 
differences in Table 2 may result from averaging over women of all incomes.  The 
marriage proportion among former welfare recipients, shown in Table 1, are much lower 
than those for all women, providing at least some evidence that lower-income women’s 
probabilities of marriage or cohabitation are being affected by welfare programs more 
than those of higher-income women. 
 Overall, Table 2 reveals that the woman's own characteristics seem correlated 
with  the marriage and cohabitation choices.  The 'lone' category is more common among 
older and better educated women, while cohabiting women are younger and have less 
education.  Married women have the same averge age as the lone group but their typical 
education level falls between those of the lone and cohabiting women.   Finally, race is 
linked to substantial differences in every category. 
 
  VI.  Framework for Analysis 
 
Utility Function and Budget Constraint 
                                                          
7 CPS=Current Population Survey.  NSFH= National Survey of Families and Households.  PSID = Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics. 
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 The decision maker is the adult woman.  She can have two types of cohabitors: a 
husband present in the household, and any other adults.  Because she may derive utility 
separately from each, they have separate terms in the utility function: MSi for marital 
status and Cohi for other adults.  She also values a composite consumption good Ci and 
leisure (Li).  Thus her utility function may be written as follows: 
 
(1)  Ui = f(Ci, MSi, Li, Cohi) 
 
 Income can come from several sources: the woman’s earned wages; cash public 
assistance payments;  property income, and gifts from cohabitors or others.  Letting Wi 
be the woman's wage and Hw her hours of work, PropIi her property income, PubTi her 
income from welfare benefits and other public transfer programs, and PrvTi the private 
contributions of cohabitants, her husband, and possibly others (such as former husbands 
through alimony), her budget constraint may be written as   
 
(2)  Ci  <=  (Hi*Wi)  +  PropIi  +  PubTi  +   PrvTi   
  
I will estimate a reduced-form model.  The exogenous variables in the models--
including the woman's personal characteristics and state-level welfare benefits and 
regulations--are arguments to the demand for household composition.      
 A woman's income may both affect her cohabitation choice and be affected by it.  
Decisions about labor force participation may depend on current marital status and 
cohabitation, making observed income a endogenous regressor.   The woman's observed 
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hourly wage would measure her potential earnings, were she to work.  Since many 
woman are not observed working in any particular month, studies such as Schultz (1994) 
use Heckman's method to correct for possible selection bias while determining predicted 
wages for each woman.  The use of predicted variables in a nonlinear framework such as 
multinomial logit may cause inconsistency, however.  I have decided not to predict the 
wage of women and men that might be relevant to the household composition choices of 
women; instead I include among the determinants of the reduced-form equations for these 
choices the variables that might reasonably be included in the wage functions.  These 
include the woman’s education, age, ethnicity, and regional labor market characteristics 
that affect employment opportunities for men and women.   
 These variables include those potentially affecting both labor supply and labor 
demand (education, age, disability status).  Two direct measures of general labor demand 
are also included: the state-level unemployment rate for men, and the state-level ratio of 
men’s to women’s unemployment rates.  Men’s unemployment rates are included 
because they may determine the probability of marriage.  Although women’s 
unemployment rates may figure directly in the choice between cohabitation and other 
household compositions, they are so highly correlated with other variables that the 
resulting t-statistics would be unreliable.  Instead the ratio of men’s to women’s rates will 
be used in conjunction with the men’s rate. 
Left unexplored here is the state-specific sex-age ratio (the proportion of single 
men to single women by age), another factor that could determine marriage rates 
(Bergstrom 1997).  Although sufficient data exists for Whites, even the larger 5% public-
use Census sample has too few observations on Blacks in many states to allow a 
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reasonable level of precision.  The relevant pool may be “marriageable” men rather than 
the total age-specific population, as implied by Wilson’s (1987) theory that declining 
marriage rates among Blacks stem in part from worsening earnings potential among 
young urban Black males.  As Mincy (1994) points out, however, this theory has not 
gathered convincing empirical support.  A final issue is the possible bias arising from the 
aggregation of local marriage markets to the state level. Yet as with unemployment rates, 
this may be offset by the greater precision of measurement at the state level.  
Other Explanatory Variables  
The remainder of this section describes the remaining regressors used to predict 
women's household composition choices.  Again, refer to Appendix B for descriptive 
statistics.    
Person-Level Variables 
 A wide range of factors has been found to influence the cohabitation and marital 
status.  Aside from welfare benefits, these include the woman's kin network (Hao 1995a), 
parental and family characteristics (Aquilino 1990; Avery et al. 1992).  Community 
mores may also affect the probability of nonmarital cohabitation (Winkler 1994).   
Controlling for economic factors, long-term trends in marriage, nonmarital cohabitation, 
and nonmarital childbearing remain (Bumpass and Sweet 1989; Bumpass and Raley 
1994; National Center for Health Statistics 1993).   
 The presence of a husband and cohabitors are assumed to relate to the woman's 
own demographics, including her age, Hispanic ethnicity, and immigrant status.  With 
increasing age may come greater opportunities for marriage, since the number of 
potential spouses met will increase.  For similar reasons the probability of cohabiting may 
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also rise with age.  Finally, there may be changes in personal preference over time with 
regard to marriage and cohabitation, as well as changes in societal views.  The square of 
age is included to allow for a nonlinear relation of age to each category.    
 Hispanic ethnicity and immigrant status are included to allow cultural differences 
to affect the choice of marriage versus cohabitation.  Immigrants in particular may also 
have less information about American housing markets, increasing the possibility of 
multiple-family households.  Finally, the greater density of Hispanics and immigrants 
within urban areas may affect the probability of each category due to the differences in 
housing markets in cities vis-à-vis suburbs and rural areas.  These demographic dummy 
variables will pick up any effect that remains once other factors (such as rural residence, 
discussed below) are controlled for. 
I also control for years of schooling.  Greater education will raise the woman's 
expected wage, thereby altering the incentive to marry.  It may also be linked to social 
views about the acceptability of premarital cohabitation.  Education is represented by 
three dummy variables: less than, more than, or exactly a high school diploma or GED.  
The distinction is based on holding a diploma or GED rather than on years of completed 
schooling.  People who report 12 years of completed schooling but who lack a diploma or 
GED fall into the 'less than' category.  Likewise, GED and diploma holders may have less  
than 12 years of completed schooling.  Anyone reporting some college study is classified 
as having 'more than' a diploma.   
Appendix B shows the relative frequencies of each group among Black and White 
women ages 18-49.  Roughly 14 percent of Whites and 23 percent of Blacks have no 
diploma, 32 percent of each group have a diploma and nothing more, while nearly 55 
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percent of Whites and 45 percent of Blacks have had some college education.  Twenty-
two percent of the polled population stopped at a high school diploma or GED, making it 
the mode level of education.  This makes it a natural break point around which to create 
dummy variables.  It is also of policy interest since state welfare programs often require 
recipients without high school diplomas to work toward a GED.   
 Another factor determining a woman's earnings potential is the presence of a 
disability that limits or prevents work.  Such a limitation would not only affect the kind 
of employment available, but it could also affect the probability of finding a spouse and 
the range of available housing.  Because the Census distinguishes between them, I 
include dummy variables for both partial and total work disability.8  I expect that the 
presence of these disabilities will be negatively related to the probability of being 
married.  It is not clear whether cohabitation with other adults will be discouraged or not: 
someone with a serious disability might choose to cohabit in order to gain help with daily 
living activities or simply to provide (extra) income.  At the same time, as with the 
marriage market there may be a disadvantage in the "cohabitation market" that comes 
with a work-limiting disability. 
    State-Level Variables                                                                                                                      
  To measure the supply of housing I include a dummy variable for residence in a 
rural area, defined as one with no town exceeding 2,500 people.  Women in rural areas 
may face different housing opportunities than those in metropolitan areas, such as a 
                                                          
8 Note that individuals may misreport disability status, potentially leading to errors-in-variables bias.  The 
Census does not provide data with which to independently verify individual disability reports, so they will 
be treated as correct.   
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smaller supply of apartments and greater difficulty in finding unrelated cohabitants.  
Social networks that vary across region may also affect household composition.9  
To capture the incentive effect of AFDC and Food Stamps, I include the 
maximum combined grant available to a family of three.  I supplement this with the 
maximum benefit levels for the other anti-poverty program described earlier, energy 
assistance (LIHEAP).  I also test for the importance of the AFDC policies described 
above: two representing different policies regarding cohabitors' income contributions 
(Policy B and Policy C), and two that concern income unearned by the woman 
(Unpredicted Income, and Shared-Expenses Income).  Each of these five is a dummy 
variable that equals '1' if the state has the relevant policy, and '0' otherwise.  While no 
state can have both Policy B and Policy C, states can disregard any combination of gift 
income, unpredicted income, and shared expenses income.   
 
VII.  Method 
 
 
 A number of models allow joint estimation of the probabilities of competing 
outcomes.  Theory does not imply a certain ordering of decisions among marriage and 
household compositions, thereby ruling out nested or hierarchical models.  The 
multinomial probit model would be ideal because it avoids the assumption of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).  A multinomial logit framework will be 
used for maximum-likelihood estimation of the model due to its tractability given the 
                                                          
 
9An alternative would be a direct measure of apartment rental costs.  Although statewide median and 25th-
percentile rents are available for each state, they were not included as covariates due to their extremely high 
correlation with AFDC benefits. 
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very large sample sizes.  Letting i subscript individuals and j subscript choices, the model 
can be written as follows: 
 
 
      e βjxi   
(4)            Prob(Yi = j) =     __________ 
                                                         2
                Σ  e βjxi
                                                        j=0
 
 
where j=0 if a woman lives as the only adult in her household, j=1 if she is married with 
spouse present, and j=2 if she cohabits with another adult but is not married with spouse 
present.  Standard errors of the logit estimates are modified to account for unobserved 
heteroscedasticity across states.  Following Stata Corporation (1997), the general formula 
for the covariance matrix VHj for choice j may be written as follows: 
 
                      51 
(5)  VHj  =  Vj  (Σ us'us)  Vj      
                                   s=1   
  
 
where Vj is the conventional covariance matrix and s indexes states.  Letting ui be   
individual i's score of the log likelihood (ui = δlnLi/δβ), us is the sum of the scores 
contributed by individuals in each state: 
 
 
 
(6)  us =  Σ ui 
          i∈s 
 
 
 
Intercorrelations of State-Level Variables 
 
 Appendix C shows the intercorrelations of the variables, broken down by race.   
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It is best to avoid estimating models that include sets of highly intercorrelated variables 
since the intercorrelated variables will have unreliable t-statistics.  
Among those measured at the individual level there are few sets of variables with 
correlation coefficients above .40 in absolute value, aside from the necessarily high 
correlations of age and age squared and of the different education levels.10  There is a 
notable correlation of Hispanic ethnicity and immigrant status for Whites (r = .46) 
although it is less for Blacks (r=.27).  
Among state-level variables high intercorrelations occur several times.  For both 
races, the AFDC benefit has a partial correlation exceeding .35 with three other potential 
covariates: the dummy for AFDC-UP, the dummy for AFDC Policy C, and the LIHEAP 
benefit.  The particularly high partial correlation with AFDC-UP--.66 for Whites and .68 
for Black--implies that it is best not to include both in the same specification.  Because 
the AFDC variable is available in every state and figures prominently in previous 
analyses of marriage and cohabitation, I will keep it and exclude AFDC-UP from my 
analyses.  The LIHEAP variable will likewise be excluded from the baseline 
specification. 
 Another very high correlation exists between two state policy variables: the 
Disregard of Gift Income (Gift Inc) and AFDC Policy C.   Although both of these 
variables in theory could affect household composition, I believe the incentive is clearest 
for Policy C and thus the Gift Income Disregard variable will be dropped.   
 A high correlation also exists between the AFDC benefit and the proportion of 
state employment in services (% Svc Emp): .47 for Whites and .59 for Blacks.  Although 
                                                          
10 Recall that the AFDC monthly benefit includes the value of Food Stamps,  hence the abbreviation 
AFDC+FS.   
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these are high, I consider it important to have measures of women’s labor demand in the 
analyses, especially in the absence of a separate measure of women’s potential wages.  
The size of the service sector is a measure of women’s labor market opportunities not 
captured by other covariates, so it will be included despite its high correlation with the 
AFDC benefit. 
 Two additional labor market measures are the race-specific state unemployment 
rates for men and women, correlated at .80 for Whites and .79 for Blacks.   The women’s 
unemployment rate is also highly correlated (r > .40) with the AFDC and LIHEAP 
benefit variables while the men’s rate has lower correlations with both.  I have chosen not 
to use the women’s unemployment rate directly as a result.  Two other variables are used 
instead.  The first is the men’s rate, measured by race and state.  The second is the ratio of 
men’s to women’s rates, again by race and state  The men’s rate and the ratio necessarily 
have a strong correlation (.53 for Whites, .55 for Blacks), but it is important to account 
for the relative labor-market opportunities of men and women. 
Empirical specifications 
 
 Two empirical specifications will be estimated.  The first, to be called the baseline 
model, contains the personal characteristics (Xf)--age and age squared, Hispanic 
ethnicity, education, immigrant status, rural status, and work disabilities--as well as the 
traditional measure of AFDC policy, the monthly maximum benefit level for a family of 
three in the woman’s state (AFDC Bens).  Regional labor-market conditions (Labor 
Markets) are represented by the state-level unemployment rates for men and the 
proportion of total employment in services.  The model includes separate dummy 
variables for two alternative state AFDC regulations, Policy B and Policy C (AFDC 
 25
B/Cs), which govern the treatment of cohabitors’ contributions to household housing 
expenses.  I expect to find results similar to those of previous studies, such as a negative 
partial correlation between AFDC benefits and the probability of being married.  Letting 
HCi  be the woman’s choice among the three household composition categories, we may 
write the baseline equation as 
 
(7) HCi =   f (Xf , Labor Markets AFDC Bens,  AFDC B/Cs)    
 
 The second model extends the analysis of AFDC policy by adding the two 
dummy variables concerning the treatment of unplanned income, those for Shared 
Expenses income and Unpredicted income (AFDC Incs).  It also includes a statewide 
average monthly benefit for LIHEAPs, the federal energy assistance program.  The 
extended model may then be written as follows: 
 
(8) HCi =   f (Xf , Labor Markets AFDC Bens,  AFDC B/Cs, AFDC Incs, LIHEAPs)    
 
Testing these additional policy variables will reveal whether they are exerting 
significant effects on women's cohabitation choice.  If so, it would suggest that policy 
makers may have a previously unrecognized tool for encouraging or discouraging various 
patterns of cohabitation.  The opposite result--no significant effects--would signal that 
these policy variables are not important determinants of cohabitation, and thus that 
previous studies have not been biased by their omission.   
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VIII.1.  Estimation Results for the Baseline Model 
 
 Estimation results for the baseline model appear in Table 3 for Whites and Table 
4 for Blacks.  Logit coefficients themselves are not directly interpretable, so I report the 
marginal effects and their standard errors.  For variable x and choice j, the number shown 
is the marginal change in the probability of choosing j associated with a one-unit change 
in variable x, all else equal.  Although during logit estimation there is necessarily an 
"omitted" category, the marginal effects are calculated for all categories.11  The required 
restriction is that the marginal effects for each variable sum to 0 across categories.   
As Greene (1991) points out, in a multinomial framework there is no necessary 
connection between the significance or sign of a logit coefficient and the significance or 
sign of its associated marginal effect.  Hence it is necessary to show the t-statistics of the 
marginal effects themselves rather than those of the logit coefficients.  
Individual-Level Variables 
The demographic variables have a substantial effect on cohabitation.  Age shows 
little relation to the probability of being a lone woman for either race, although the 
marginal effects are usually significant.  The probability of being a cohabiting woman 
falls steadily until roughly age 40, after which it rises.  The opposite pattern holds for 
married women.   Chi-square tests reveal that age and age squared are jointly significant 
across the three categories. 
 Greater education is expected to raise the probability of being a lone woman and 
reduce the probability of being married.  The latter effect depends on greater education 
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being associated with higher potential earnings, so that women with more education will 
have less potential economic gain from marriage than women with less education (Becker 
1981).  This pattern holds for White women having 13 or more years of completed 
education, relative to the omitted group who have high-school or GED diplomas.   
Among Black women, however, there is a positive effect of higher education on the 
probability of being married.  Similarly, lower education should decrease the probability 
of being a lone woman and raise the probability of marriage.  Instead I find sizable and 
negative coefficients on both the married and lone-woman categories.   
The differential impact by race of women’s resources (proxied here by education) 
has been noted elsewhere.  Using 1980 Census data, Schultz (1994) finds that higher 
property income and higher predicted wages make Black women more likely to marry 
but White women less likely.   Census data from 1990 again reveal a negative relation 
between White women’s predicted wages and marriage, while for Blacks the wage is now 
insignificant for those aged 25-44 (Schultz 1998).  The welfare system, by increasing 
women’s potential resources, would tend to further the movement of White women out of 
marriage into cohabitation.   As detailed below, a similar pattern emerges for Blacks, but 
the marginal effects are so small that the total impact of AFDC and LIHEAP benefits is 
minimal. 
Hispanic ethnicity and immigrant status have strong but differing effects on 
women’s cohabitation choice.  Hispanic White women are more than eight percentage 
points more likely to be cohabiting than are others, while being less likely to be married 
or lone women.  By contrast, Hispanic ethnicity has small and mostly insignificant effects 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 This is true because the marginal effect of variable x for category j depends on the logit coefficients of x 
for every category.  Thus even though the coefficients for the "omitted" category are set to zero, the 
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for Blacks.  Across races, immigrant status exerts a sizable positive effect on the 
probability of being married: 7.5 percentage points for Whites, and 12.7 points for 
Blacks.  Immigrants are less likely to be cohabiting or living as lone women, again for 
both races. 
 Rural residence also has a substantial impact on cohabitation.  For both races, 
rural women are more likely to be married and less likely to cohabit or be the sole 
household adult.  Relative to women in urban areas, rural White women are more than 
14.2 percentage points more likely to be married; for Black women the figure is 8.3 
percent.  These follow theoretical expectation if rural areas have fewer apartments than 
do urban areas.  If they also have more conservative social views (as is typical of rural 
states in the Midwest, for example), premarital cohabitation may be less common.   
 The woman's labor force potential is captured through several variables.  At the 
individual level these include the presence of a woman’s partial or total work disability.    
Both levels of disability have large, negative impacts on the probability of marriage.  For 
Whites with total work disability, the impact is –23.7 percentage points—the largest 
marginal effect of any variable.   This accords with my expectation that women with 
disabilities will find fewer potential husbands.  An alternative explanation is that the 
onset of disability precipitates divorce.  The positive sign on cohabitation may reflect 
disabled women living with their families or others who can provide support.  The 
positive marginal effect on being a lone woman may be due to the availability of 
government support for the disabled, as through the Medicaid and Social Security 
programs. 
State-Level Variables  
                                                                                                                                                                             
marginal effects are not constrained.  See Greene (1993) or Greene (1995) for details. 
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 Next come three labor-demand factors measured at the state level: the  
unemployment rate for men, the ratio of men’s to women’s unemployment rates, and the 
proportion of state employment in the service sector.   Greater economic opportunities for 
women and fewer opportunities for men are expected to correspond to a lower probability 
of marriage, with a consequently greater probability of the cohabiting and lone-woman 
categories.  I find higher unemployment rates for men relative to women to be associated 
with fewer marriages among Blacks.  A higher proportion of employment in services, 
which serves here as a proxy for women’s labor demand, is likewise associated with 
fewer marriages. 
The men’s unemployment rate is insignificant among Whites for each category.  
Two of three marginal effects are significant for Blacks in the base model and have signs 
that match theoretical expectation, but the magnitudes are quite small: a three-percentage-
point rise in the men’s unemployment rates would be associated with just a one-
percentage-point rise in the probability of cohabiting, all else equal.  
The ratio of men’s to women’s unemployment rates are also insignificant across 
all choices for White women in the base model while being significant for the 
cohabitation and marriage categories among Blacks.   A test of joint significance for the 
two unemployment variables was performed due to their naturally high correlation.  For 
Whites the two variables are significant at the 95-percent-confidence level, a signal that 
they add explanatory power to the model despite the individual insignificance of the 
marginal effects.  For Blacks the two variables are significant at beyond the 99-percent 
confidence level and follow the expected pattern: as the ratio rises women’s economic 
opportunities are rising relative to men’s, making marriage less attractive. 
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 The proportion of employment in services is significantly related to White 
women’s marriage and cohabitation choices but never reaches conventional significance 
levels for Blacks.   A one-standard-deviation rise in the proportion of service employment 
for Whites (.245) is associated with a rise in the likelihood of cohabitation of 15.4 
percentage points, all else equal, and a similar fall in the probability of marriage.   
 The remaining variables refer to welfare programs, including benefit levels and 
the treatment of income from cohabitors and those outside the recipient family.  If 
benefits are available to unmarried women only, I expect to find positive marginal effects 
for lone and cohabiting women and negative effects for married women.  Policies that 
treat income from cohabitors and other sources more leniently should have the same 
pattern: lower probability of marriage, higher probability of cohabitation.   
The combined AFDC and Food Stamp benefit (AFDC+FS) is generally available 
only to unmarried women, cohabiting or not.12  The marginal effects of the monthly 
benefit are all insignificant at conventional levels for Black women in the base model 
(Table 4), while there is mixed significance in the extended model (Table 6).  In the 
latter, I find that a $100 rise in monthly benefits would decrease the probability of 
marriage by 0.77%, a rather small amount.  For Whites the AFDC benefit is significant at 
the 95% confidence level or greater in both models, although the marginal impact is 
likewise limited.  A $100 rise in monthly benefits, for example, would decrease the 
probability of a White woman being married by 1.9 percentage points in both models. 
  Each state's policy on cohabitors' contributions to housing costs is captured by the 
variables Policy B and Policy C.  Recall that the omitted category, Policy A, is one in 
                                                          
12 A married woman was eligible for the main AFDC program if her husband was not the father of any of 
her coresiding children.   
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which women receiving AFDC are not penalized (i.e., do not receive reduced benefits) if 
they have cohabitors who contribute toward housing costs.  I expect the marginal effects 
of Policy B to be insignificant since it mandates no benefit reduction if the woman 
contributes even one dollar to her own housing costs.  Not surprisingly, Policy B is often 
insignificant.  Although it reaches the 90-percent confidence level for the cohabitation 
category for Whites, the magnitude is nearly zero.   
Policy C calls for the woman's AFDC benefit to be reduced dollar-for-dollar with 
any rise in cohabitor contributions.  It should have a negative effect on cohabitation, all 
else equal.  Here I find an unexpected negative and significant coefficient for Policy C for 
both Whites and Blacks.  The sign on lone women is positive for Whites, as theory would 
suggest, although negative and insignificant for Black women.   A chi-square test reveals 
policies B and C to be jointly significant across all three choices for both races. 
The unusual results for Policy C may stem from the fact that only two states had it 
in 1990: New York and New Hampshire.  Having roughly 20 times the population of 
New Hampshire, New York contributes most of the observations for which Policy C = 1.  
The unusual correlation of Policy C with more cohabitation may simply reflect a large 
proportion of cohabiting women in New York state, rather than the effect of the policy 
itself.  Or New York may have the policy but choose not to enforce it, thereby 
encouraging cohabitation. 
 
VIII.2.  Estimation Results for the Full Model 
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 The baseline model included only a sparse set of welfare variables.  The full 
model, reported in Tables 5 and 6, adds three additional variables: two representing state 
AFDC policies on the treatment of unearned income and one representing the statewide 
average benefit for LIHEAP, the federal energy assistance program. 
 The importance of adding these variables can be assessed through a joint 
significance test across the three household composition categories.  As reported at the 
end of Tables 5 and 6, I find that the three new (starred) variables are highly significant, 
with p-values well below .01 across races.  For Blacks the significance appears to rely on 
a single variable, however—the monthly LIHEAP benefit.    
Individual-Level Variables 
 The marginal effect for variables measured at the individual level are quite similar 
to those of the baseline model.  Factors associated with greater likelihood of marriage 
include higher age, having a high school education or GED, immigrant status, and rural 
residence.  More cohabitation is associated with work disabilities and having less than, or 
more than, a high-school diploma or GED.  Those more likely to be lone women are 
younger, have more than a high-school education, have a work disability, and live in 
urban areas.  For both Blacks and Whites, the addition of the three policy variables does 
not have a substantive effect on the signs or magnitudes of the individual-level variables. 
State-Level Variables 
 The two unemployment measures achieve joint significance for both races.  The 
men’s unemployment rate again has a sizable impact on women’s cohabitation and 
marriage choices.  A 3-percentage-point rise would lead to a 2-percentage-point rise in 
the likelihood of cohabitation among Whites, and about half that amount among Blacks.   
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The marginal effects for marriage are similar in size, with the opposite sign.   The ratio of 
men’s to women’s unemployment rates also has a large effect.  A one-standard-deviation 
rise in the ratio would increase marriage among White women by about 1 percentage 
point, while lowering it roughly 1.4 percentage points for Blacks.  The positive sign for 
Whites is difficult to explain, since in theory there should be a negative relation between 
women’s rising economic opportunities and their probability of marriage.   As in the 
baseline model, a rise in the proportion of state employment in the service sector is 
associated with fewer marriages and more cohabitation. 
 Looking at AFDC, the marginal effects are now somewhat smaller for Blacks, but 
the signs are the same as in the baseline model for both races.  Higher monthly AFDC 
and Food Stamp benefits are associated with fewer lone women and fewer married 
women.  The variable representing Policy B is again insignificant at conventional levels 
for Whites and Blacks, as expected.  Policy C is associated with more cohabitation and 
fewer marriages for both races, as before.  
The next two policies concern unearned income which cohabitors might 
contribute to an AFDC recipient.  These are dummy variables coded as '1' if the state 
disregards income of each type, and '0' otherwise.  Each disregard increases the woman's 
potential income while on welfare.  Since most welfare recipients are unmarried, these 
variables ought to be positively correlated with being a lone woman and with 
cohabitation and negatively correlated with marriage. The most consistent finding is a 
negative relation between these policies and the probability of marriage, which follows 
theoretical expectation.  Among Whites the marginal effects are insignificant for the 
Shared Expenses variable.  The Unpredicted Income policy variable is positively and 
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significantly related to cohabitation, but has a small, negative marginal effect on the lone-
woman category.   Among Blacks these two variables have only insignificant effects. 
 The final variable, LIHEAP, should have a negative effect on the probability of 
living as a lone woman.  I find a significant impact on each category.  As theory would 
suggest, the marginal effect on the probability of being a lone woman is negative for both 
races.  The magnitudes are quite small, however: a $100 rise in the statewide average 
LIHEAP benefit would reduce the rate of lone womanhood by a fraction of one 
percentage point.   
 
 IX.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has presented a multinomial logit model of a woman's cohabitation 
choice.  It investigated the connection between cohabitation and state welfare policies, 
including benefit levels and regulations on how cohabitors' contributions to household 
expenditures are counted.  It also extended previous analyses by including separate 
estimation for White and Black women without limiting them to subgroups such as 
married women or mothers. 
Aside from welfare programs, many variables were found to substantially alter the 
choice of cohabitation.   Across races a pattern appears in which marriage probabilities 
rise until age 40, probably replacing cohabitation.  After 40 marriage falls while 
cohabitation and living alone rise.  Other factors associated with a fewer marriages 
include partial and total work disabilities and having exactly 12 years of education.   
Immigrant status appears to have a strong, positive effect on the probability of marriage  
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and a simultaneous negative impact on being a lone woman.  Partial and total work 
disabilities are associated with more cohabitation.    
I expected to find that women would react to financial incentives created by the 
AFDC program, including both benefits and regulations.   I find that higher monthly 
AFDC and Food Stamps benefits have the expected negative association with marriage 
rates.   Policy B has little effect on marriage and cohabitation choices, while Policy C has 
an unexpected positive impact on cohabitation rates.   In the extended models, the 
disregard for Shared Expenses income from cohabitors is always insignificant, while the 
Unpredicted Income disregard has the predicted positive impact on cohabitation among 
White women. 
One measure of the impact of these regulations is the difference in the probability 
of being in each cohabitation category under the most lenient and most restrictive state 
welfare regimes.  The combination of welfare regulations that would be most lenient 
towards cohabitors' income contributions would be Policy A (the omitted choice in these 
regressions) and a value of '1' for the dummy variables representing the Shared Expenses, 
and Unpredicted Income categories (meaning the state disregarded each type of income).   
The most restrictive stance toward cohabitors would occur if a state followed Policy C 
and had none of three income disregards.  Table 7 shows the results of this thought 
experiment using the marginal effects of the full model (Tables 5 and 6).  Each figure is 
the total impact on each race-category pair of a change from the most to the least 
restrictive policies.  Accompanying each number is the result of a chi-square test of 
significance, with the associated p-value in parentheses below. 
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I find a surprising difference in magnitudes and significance across races.  
Moving from most to least restrictive policies would decrease the proportion of lone 
White women, as expected, but would raise it at least slightly for Blacks.  Contrary to 
theory, among Blacks there would be a fall in the proportion of cohabiting women, all 
else equal.  The proportion of married women would rise almost 1 percent for Whites and 
4.2 percent for Blacks.   
 Several other conclusions may be drawn from the results of this paper.  First, the 
notable difference in outcomes across races suggests that states may wish to take the 
racial distribution of their poor population into account when determining expected 
outcomes of AFDC policies.  Second, the AFDC policies studied here appear to exert 
substantial effects on marriage and cohabitation, although they are not consistent across 
races.  Still, these results point to the usefulness of including AFDC regulations in models 
of household composition in addition to the usual AFDC benefit level.  Third, the 
omission of LIHEAP benefits from previous models has probably not led to substantial 
bias.  Although they are usually significant here, the marginal effects are quite small. 
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Table 1 
 
Proportions of Cohabiting and Married Women from Selected Data Sources 
 
 
I.  1990 Census: all women  
   Whites    Blacks Whites   Blacks  Whites   Blacks  
   18-49   18-49   18-29     18-29   30-49     30-49 
 
Married:       .640    .367    .441    .216     .761       .472 
Cohabiting:     .286    .549    .495       .718                   .160       .431 
Lone      .073     .084    .064       .066     .079     .097 
 
Note: Married women live with their husbands and may or may not live with other adults besides.  
Cohabiting women live with other adults (of either sex) and are either unmarried or are married but do not 
live with their husbands.   
 
II.  Hu (1997) : former welfare recipients in California 
 
   Former AFDC  Former AFDC-UP 
  Recipients  Recipients 
 
Married :  .101    .718   
Cohabiting:  .082    .176  
 
 
Note: The data include 2164 mothers living in four California counties, all of whom received AFDC or 
AFDC-UP in December, 1992.  Thirty-one percent are Black.  All were interviewed between October 1993 
and September 1994.  Hu does not define any of the categories explicitly, but her discussion implies that 
the “cohabiting” women are unmarried and live with an unmarried man.  Source: Appendix Table 1. 
 
 
III.  Moffitt et al. (1995a) : women receiving AFDC in the previous year 
 
  survey:   CPS  NSFH  PSID  NLSY   
 year:  1990  1988  1987  1987   
  ages:  18-55  19-55  18-55  22-29 
 
Married:  .233   .300   .196   .263  
Cohabiting:  .083   .086   .092   .169  
 
Notes:  The proportion of Blacks is not provided.  Definitions of each survey’s universe follows, quoted 
from the source. CPS: Universe includes all women who were family or nonfamily heads or spouses in 
one-family or two-family households.  Cohabitors are defined as those women in the universe who live in 
the same two-family household as an unrelated adult male.  AFDC recipiency is based on receipt by the 
woman, her spouse, or her male cohabitor. NSFH: Universe includes all respondent women (headship is 
not a criterion). Welfare recipiency includes Food Stamps and is based on receipt by the woman, her 
spouse, or her male cohabitor. PSID: Universe includes all women who were household heads, spouses of 
heads, or cohabitors of heads (subfamily heads are excluded).  AFDC recipiency is based on receipt by the 
woman, her spouse, or her male cohabitor.  NLSY: Universe includes all women (headship is not a 
criterion).  AFDC recipiency is based on receipt by the woman or her spouse.  Source:  Table 1. 
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Table 2 
 
Values of Selected Variables, by Race and Cohabitation Category1
 
      
   Lone  Cohabiting         Married 
 
White Women Ages 18-49 
 
Age      34.5        28.1  35.4 
 
Less than a High School 
  Diploma or GED     .059        .185  .124 
 
More than a High School 
  Diploma or GED    .746        .517  .534 
 
State AFDC + FS Benefit        $ 634.71  $ 643.88        $ 623.29 
 
Cohabitation Category   .073       .286  .640 
 
 
Black Women Ages 18-49 
 
Age     34.7        30.0  35.5 
 
Less than a High School 
  Diploma or GED   .147             .280   .176 
 
More than a High School 
  Diploma or GED   .618        .390  .495 
 
State AFDC + FS Benefit        $ 610.60  $ 602.81        $ 587.63 
 
Cohabitation Category  .084       .549  .367 
 
Source:  1990 Census.  See Ruggles and Sobek (1997). 
 
 1 The categories here are the same as those used in the regression analysis.  They are 
defined as follows.  'Lone Women' have no other adults in the household.  They can be 
married only if the husband is absent.  'Cohabiting Women' have other adults in the 
household.  They too can be married, again only if the husband is not present.  'Married 
Women' are those who identify themselves as married and living with their husbands.  
They may have, but are not required to have, other adults in the household.   
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Table 3 
 
Multinomial Logit Model of White Women's Household Composition: 
Marginal Effects for Baseline Model  
 
      Lone        Cohabiting Married 
 
Personal  Characteristics 
 
Intercept   -.1166   1.851  -1.735 
     (5.46)   (36.5)   (31.6) 
 
Age    -.001506 -.1254   .1269 
     (1.64)   (55.1)   (53.1) 
 
Age Squared     .002983  .1597  -.1627 
  (x 10-2)     (2.40)    (65.6)    (61.0) 
 
Chi-Square Statistic      7460. 
(Age and Age Squared)  (p < .01) 
 
Less than High  -.01575  .05567 -.03992 
  School  or GED    (4.54)   (11.6)   (6.67) 
 
More than High   .05113   .01294 -.06407 
  School  or GED   (29.0)     (5.18)   (20.9) 
 
Hispanic    -.03854   .08456 -.04602    
   (7.15)    (7.67)   (3.12) 
 
Immigrant   -.02569 -.04913  .07482 
       (5.88)    (6.96)   (8.62) 
 
Rural Area    -.06651 -.07530   .1418 
     (25.5)    (18.3)     (34.8) 
 
Partial Work Disability   .03113  .1011  -.1322 
     (12.2)    (13.3)   (17.2) 
 
Total Work Disability    .03786   .1990  -.2368 
     (10.4)    (30.6)   (28.8) 
 
State-Level Variables 
 
Men’s Unemployment  .09542  .1846  -.2800 
  Rate (%)    (.771)   (.731)   (1.06) 
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Table 3, cont’d 
 
      Lone        Cohabiting Married 
 
 
Ratio, Men’s to Women’s  .001994 -.02206  .02007 
  Unemployment Rates (.243)   (1.07)   (.944) 
 
Chi-Square Statistic      12.57 
(Unemployment  Vars.)  (p = .05) 
 
Proportion of Employ-  .02903  .6294  -.6584 
  ment in Services  (.548)   (3.44)   (3.36) 
 
AFDC + FS   -.02820  .2170  -.1888 
 (x 10-3)     (2.09)   (6.84)     (6.64) 
 
State AFDC Policies on Cohabitors' Contributions 
 
AFDC Policy B   .001511 -9.427e-5 -.001417 
     (.558)    (2.01)    (.127) 
 
AFDC Policy C    .01295   .01425 -.02720 
     (4.20)     (2.01)  (3.64) 
 
Chi-Square Statistic     689.5 
(Policies A & B)   (p < .01)   
 
Chi-Square Statistic     5.976e6 
(All Variables)    (p < .01) 
 
 
Actual Probability:    .073    .286    .640 
(mean of dependent var.) 
 
 
No. Obs: 232,094   
 
 
Note:  absolute value of asymptotic t-statistics (in parentheses) reflects correction for 
state-level heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 4 
 
Multinomial Logit Model of Black Women's Household Composition: 
Marginal Effects for Baseline Model 
 
      Lone        Cohabiting Married 
 
Personal Characteristics 
 
Intercept    -.3451   2.124  -1.779   
      (14.0)  (32.2)   (25.5) 
 
Age      .008939 -.1189   .1100 
       (8.89)  (43.6)   (36.6) 
 
Age Squared   -.009980  .1493  -.1393 
 (x 10-2)     (6.99)   (37.8)   (31.0) 
 
Chi-Square Statistic     3.399e5 
(age and age squared)     (p < .01) 
 
Less than High   -.01087  .1084  -.09758 
  School or GED      (2.93)   (14.1)    (15.4) 
 
More than High      .04905 -.07847  .02942 
  School or GED     (17.2)    (14.5)   (6.51) 
 
Hispanic   -.007411 -.007986  .01540 
        (17.2)    (.933)   (1.19) 
 
Immigrant   -.02940 -.09773   .1271 
       (4.17)    (5.50)   (7.57) 
 
Rural Area    -.06390 -.01937  .08327 
    (13.5)    (2.03)   (9.74) 
 
Partial Work Disability   .008026  .08565 -.09368 
     (1.21)    (7.42)    (7.78) 
 
Total Work Disability   .02819   .1416  -.1698 
     (4.92)    (14.2)    (16.6) 
 
State-Level Variables 
 
Men’s Unemployment -.006218  .3326  -.3264 
  Rate (%)    (.0916)  (3.50)   (3.20) 
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Table 4, cont’d 
 
      Lone        Cohabiting Married 
 
 
Ratio, Men’s to Women’s  .009270  .06712 -.07639 
  Unemployment Rates  (.647)   (2.58)   (2.82) 
 
Chi-Square Statistic      90.15 
(Unemployment  Vars.)  (p < .01) 
 
Proportion of Employ-  .05545  .3119  -.3673 
   ment in Services   (.458)   (1.42)   (1.19) 
 
AFDC + FS    .005285  .08710 -.09238 
 (x 10-3)    (.281)    (1.07)   (1.10) 
 
State AFDC Policies on Cohabitors' Contributions 
 
Policy B    .004434 -.02313  .01870 
     (.562)    (1.35)   (1.01) 
 
Policy C   -.003689  .03786 -.03417 
     (.724)    (3.56)   (2.72) 
 
Chi-Square Statistic     80.65  
(policies B & C)   (p < .01)  
 
Chi-Square Statistic    6.212e6   
(all variables)     (p < .01) 
 
Actual Probability:    .084      .549    .367 
(mean of dependent var.) 
 
 
No. Obs:  64,497 
 
 
Note:  absolute value of asymptotic t-statistics (in parentheses) reflects correction for 
state-level heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 5 
 
Multinomial Logit Model of White Women's Household Composition: 
Marginal Effects for Full Model  
 
      Lone        Cohabiting  Married 
               
Personal Characteristics 
 
Intercept   -.1140    1.855  -1.741 
     (5.28)    (33.7)   (30.0) 
 
Age    -.001496 -.1254   .1269 
      (1.59)    (52.0)   (51.7) 
 
Age Squared     .002967  .1597  -.001627 
  (x 10-2)      (2.36)  (55.2)   (54.3) 
 
Chi-Square Statistic     6.317e4   
(age and age squared)    (p < .01)  
 
Less than High  -.01581  .05597 -.04017 
  School or GED    (4.61)    (11.8)   (6.833) 
 
More than High   .05094  .01322 -.06416 
  School or GED    (32.6)    (5.47)    (22.3) 
 
Hispanic    -.03938  .08748 -.04810   
     (7.04)    (7.85)    (3.27) 
 
Immigrant   -.02566 -.04894  .07460 
       (5.91)    (7.01)    (8.66) 
 
Rural Area   -.06636 -.07552  .1419 
     (29.2)    (19.7)    (36.2) 
 
Partial Work Disability   .03778  .1993  -.2371 
     (10.4)    (30.0)   (28.5) 
 
Total Work Disability    .03102  .1012  -.1322 
     (12.8)    (13.4)   (17.1) 
 
State-Level Variables 
 
Men’s Unemployment -.03049  .6693  -.6388  
  Rate (%)    (.218)   (2.65)   (2.26) 
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Table 5, cont’d 
 
      Lone        Cohabiting Married 
 
Ratio, Men’s to Women’s  .01278 -.06686 .05408 
  Unemployment Rates  (1.23)   (2.86)   (2.22) 
 
Chi-Square Statistic      87.72 
(Unemployment  Vars.)  (p < .01) 
 
Proportion of Employ-  .02261  .5952   -.6178 
  ment in Services   (.407)   (3.20)   (3.07) 
 
AFDC + FS   -.03075   .2183  -.1876 
 (x 10-3)    (3.66)    (7.72)   (6.31) 
 
State AFDC Policies on Cohabitors' Contributions 
Policy B    .003700 -.004983 -.001282 
    (1.47)  (.466)   (.118) 
 
Policy C    .01316  .01239 -.02555 
     (6.50)   (1.72)   (3.12) 
  
Chi-Square Statistic     409.0 
(policies B & C)   (p < .01)  
 
State AFDC Policies on Unearned Income 
* Shared Expenses   .001889   .004878 -.006768 
      (.753)    (.724)    (1.06) 
 
* Unpredicted Income  -.005992  .01495 -.008960 
      (2.05)    (1.90)    (1.08) 
 
Other Public Assistance 
* LIHEAP Avg. Benefit -.02239  .09579 -.07340 
 (x 10-3)      (1.91)    (2.99)     (2.48) 
 
Chi-Square Statistic       275.0 
(starred variables)    (p < .01)  
 
Chi-Square Statistic     9.536e6 
(all variables)     (p < .01) 
 
Actual Probability:    .073     .286     .640 
No. Obs: 232,094   
Note:  absolute value of asymptotic t-statistics (in parentheses) and reflect correction for 
state-level heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 6 
 
Multinomial Logit Model of Black Women's Household Composition: 
Marginal Effects for Full Model 
 
      Lone        Cohabiting Married 
 
Personal Characteristics 
 
Intercept   -.3497    2.140  -1.790 
     (7.33)   (29.2)   (20.5) 
 
Age     .008936 -.1189   .1100 
      (4.77)   (31.9)   (24.6) 
 
Age Squared    -.009973   .1493  -.001393 
  (x 10-2)      (4.35)   (30.8)   (24.2) 
 
Chi-Square Statistic     2.836e4   
(age and age squared)    (p < .01)  
 
Less than High  -.01081  .1083  -.09744 
  School or GED    (2.39)   (16.5)   (13.8) 
 
More than High   .04904 -.07828  .02924 
  School or GED    (6.80)   (15.0)   (7.30) 
 
Hispanic    -.007259 -.008259  .01552   
   (1.20)   (.625)   (1.03) 
 
Immigrant   -.02904 -.09927  .1283 
       (4.42)   (9.94)   (14.7) 
 
Rural Area    -.06377   .02016 -.08394 
     (6.19)    (2.31)   (15.8) 
 
Partial Work Disability  .007943  .08598 -.09392 
     (2.53)    (8.36)   (10.4) 
 
Total Work Disability    .02791  .1427  -.1706 
      (4.55)  (13.9)   (16.9) 
 
State-Level Variables
 
Men’s Unemployment  .001066  .3301  -.3314  
  Rate (%)     (.00645)  (1.03)   (1.17) 
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Table 6, cont’d 
 
      Lone        Cohabiting Married 
 
Ratio, Men’s to Women’s  .01172  .05134 -.06305 
  Unemployment Rates   (1.04)   (1.69)   (2.31) 
 
Chi-Square Statistic      48.98 
(Unemployment  Vars.)  (p < .01) 
 
Proportion of Employ-  .05620  .3067  -.3629 
  ment in Services    (.953)   (1.34)   (1.68) 
 
AFDC + FS    .008339  .06824 -.07658 
 (x 10-3)    (.779)   (1.92)    (2.40) 
 
State AFDC Policies on Cohabitors' Contributions 
Policy B   .001293 -.01560  .01431 
    (.386)   (1.16)   (1.20) 
 
Policy C   -.005023  .04436 -.03933 
     (2.55)   (4.99)   (4.56) 
 
Chi-Square Statistic     277.7 
(policies B & C)   (p < .01)  
 
State AFDC Policies on Unearned Income 
* Shared Expenses   .003494 -.006926  .003432 
     (.999)   (.785)   (.484) 
 
* Unpredicted Income   .003296 -.003153 -.0001429 
     (.878)     (.319)    (.01603) 
 
Other Public Assistance 
* LIHEAP Avg. Benefit   -.02201    .1071 -.08514 
 (x 10-3)      (1.55)    (2.61)   (2.65) 
 
Chi-Square Statistic     133.2 
(starred variables)  (p < .01)  
 
Chi-Square Statistic   4.589e7 
(all variables)     (p < .01) 
 
Actual Probability:    .073     .286     .640 
No. Obs: 64,497   
Note:  absolute value of asymptotic t-statistics (in parentheses) and reflect correction for 
state-level heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 7 
 
Combined Marginal Effects of Changes in Welfare Variables  
on Women Ages 18-49,  by Race *
 
 
 
 Lone        Cohabiting          Married 
 
 
 
Whites               -.01726           .007437 .009822 
     
Chi-square statistic               47.04 
  (all choices)              (p < .01) 
 
 
 
Blacks               .01181  -.05444  .04262  
 
Chi-square statistic      32.66 
   (all choices)              (p < . 01) 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
* These figures derive from Tables 5 and 6 the full models.   They measure the 
percentage-point change in the probability of living in each category based on a change 
from the least lenient to the most generous AFDC policies regarding unearned income.  
To calculate each number, find the sum of the coefficients for Shared Expenses and 
Unpredicted Income, then add the coefficient for Policy C multiplied by –1.  For 
instance,  consider the ‘Lone’ category for White women (Table 5).  The sum is               
(-1*.01316) + .001889 + (-.005992) = -.01726.   The chi-square test for each race has the 
null hypothesis that the three coefficients sum to 0 for lone women, for cohabiting 
women, and for married women simultaneously.  This constitutes three restrictions, so 
each test has three degrees of freedom.  The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
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 Appendix A 
 
State AFDC Policies 
 
 
Column (1) 'x' denotes disregard of contributions for shared household expenses 
Column (2) 'x' denotes disregard of unpredictable contributions 
Column (3) 'x' denotes disregard of $30 per quarter in gift income 
Column (4):  Shelter-Grant Reduction Policy   
      A: AFDC grant is not affected if recipients receive free shelter 
      B:  AFDC grant reduced by shelter grant amount if free shelter provided,   
   unless recipients contribute any money 
      C:  AFDC grant reduced by shelter grant amount if free shelter provided, or         
   by amount of recipients' contribution if any contribution is made 
 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Southeast      
Alabama  -  -  x  A 
DC  x  -  x  A 
Florida  x  x  x  B 
 
Georgia  x  -  -  A 
Kentucky  -  -  x  A 
Louisiana  -  -  x   A 
 
Maryland  x  -  -  A 
Mississippi -  -  x  A 
No. Carolina x  -  x  A 
 
So. Carolina x  x  x  A 
Tennessee x  -  x  A 
Texas  x  -  x  A 
 
Virginia   -  x  x  A 
W. Virginia x  -  -  A 
 
 
West
Arizona  -  x  x  B 
California  x  -  x  A 
Colorado  -  -  -  B 
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Appendix A, cont'd 
 
 
Hawaii  x  -  x  A 
Nevada  x  -  x  A 
New Mexico -  -  x  B 
 
Oklahoma x  -  x  B 
Oregon  x  -  x  A 
Utah  x  x  x  A 
 
Washington x  -  x  B 
 
 
Northeast
Connecticut -  -  x  A 
Delaware  -  -  x  A 
Massachusetts x  -  x  B 
 
New Hampshire x  x  x  C 
New Jersey -  -  x  A 
New York x  -  -  C 
 
Pennsylvania x  -  x  A 
Rhode Island -  -  x  A 
 
 
Midwest
Arkansas  -  -  x  A 
Illinois  x  -  x  A 
Indiana  x  x  x  A 
 
Kansas  -  -  x  A 
Michigan  -  -  x  A 
Minnesota x  -  x  A 
 
Missouri  -  x  x  A 
Nebraska  x  x  x  B 
Ohio  x  x  x  A 
 
Wisconsin x  -  x  A 
 
 
 
Source: Moffit, Reville and Winkler (1995b)  Appendix Tables B1, B2   
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Appendix  B.1 
 
Descriptive Statistics for the Entire Sample, by Race:  
Whites and Blacks1
 
 Whites Whites  Blacks Blacks 
 Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
      
Lone Women .074 .261  .084 .278 
Married Women .641 .480  .367 .482 
Cohabiting Women .285 .452  .549 .498 
Age  (yrs.) 33.2 8.73  32.4 8.93 
Age2  (yrs. / 100) 11.79 5.88  11.3 5.92 
Hispanic   .073 .260  .019 .137 
Less than a High School Diploma or GED .137 .344  .231 .421 
High School Diploma or GED .317 .465  .322 .467 
More than a High School Diploma or GED .546 .500  .448 .497 
Partial Work Disability .029 .169  .033 .178 
Total Work Disability .022 .146  .040 .196 
Immigrant Status .062 .241  .071 .257 
Rural Area .266 .442  .118 .322 
Men’s Unemployment Rate (%) 5.54 1.27  13.9 4.38 
Ratio, Men’s to Women’s Unemp. Rates 1.06 .180  1.10 .226 
Proportion of Employment in Services .245 .034  .241 .040 
AFDC + Food Stamps Benefit  ($) 630.02 124.18  597.90 128.78 
 AFDC Policy B  (Cohabitors' Income) .180 .385  .090 .286 
 AFDC Policy C  (Cohabitors' Income) .079 .270  .101 .302 
 AFDC Policy on Shared-Expenses Income .698 .459  .691 .462 
 AFDC Policy on Unpredictable Income .224 .417  .206 .404 
 LIHEAP Benefit  ($) 188.63 121.98  172.57 111.09 
      
Number of Observations* 232,094   64,497  
      
 
Note 
*These numbers represent the samples used throughout the paper. 
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Appendix B.2 
 
Definitions and Sources 
 
State-Level Variables  
 
Men’s Unemployment Rate;  Ratio, Men’s to Women’s Unemployment Rates: 1990 
unemployment rates by sex and state.  Source:  IPUMS (Ruggles and Sobek 
1997). 
Proportion of Employment in Services: 1989 employment in services as a proportion of 
  all nonfarm employment, by state, as classified in the 1987 Standard Industrial 
  Classification Manual.  Service employment excludes the finance, insurance and 
  real estate industries.  Source:  Statistical Abstract of the U.S.  (1992), Table 668.  
LIHEAP: average 1990 assistance given to LIHEAP cases in the woman's state. 
 Source:  House of Representatives (1991), Appendix O, Table 37. 
AFDC + Food Stamps:  the maximum monthly combined benefit of AFDC plus Food
 Stamps for a family of three with no other income, in real (1995) dollars, by state 
  and year.   The family is assumed to have no other countable income and to have 
  the full deductions allowed under the Food Stamp program.   
Source: U.S. House of Representatives (1991), Section 7, Table 7.
AFDC Policies  Source: Moffitt et al. (1995b)  
  AFDC Policy B: A dummy variable equaling '1' if the state has the following policy: the 
  monthly AFDC grant is reduced by the amount of the shelter allowance if the 
  woman receives free shelter, unless she contributes any money to her own shelter 
  expenses.  
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Appendix B.2, cont'd 
 
AFDC Policy C: A dummy variable equaling '1' if the state has the following policy: the 
  monthly AFDC grant is reduced by the amount of the shelter allowance if the  
  woman receives free shelter; if her shelter costs are partly paid by another person, 
  her grant is reduced by the amount of that contribution, up to the level of the 
  shelter allowance.   
AFDC Policy on Shared-Expenses Income: A dummy variable equaling '1' if the state 
  disregards contributions from cohabitors for shared household expenses.     
  AFDC Policy on Unpredictable Income: A dummy variable equaling '1' if the state 
  disregards unpredictable income earned by the woman.   
 
Person-Level Variables   
Source: 1990 Census (Ruggles and Sobek 1997) 
 
Lone women: women 18 and older who have no other adults in the same household. 
 
Married women: women 18 and older who report being married and living with their 
 
 husbands.  They may or may not live with other adults as well. 
 
Cohabiting women: women 18 and older who report being unmarried (or married but not  
 
 living with a husband) and who live with at least one other adult.   
 
Years of Completed Schooling: highest grade completed.  
Hispanic: Dummy variable that equals 1 if the woman claimed Hispanic ethnicity. 
Immigrant: Dummy variable that equals 1 if the woman was born outside the United  
 States, except for children of American parents born abroad.   
Rural Area: Dummy variable that equals 1 if the woman does not live in a municipality 
 or Census-defined "area" having 2,500 people or more.   
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Appendix B.2, cont'd 
 
Partial Work Disability: Dummy variable that equals 1 if the woman has a disability that 
  limits but does not prevent work.   
Total Work Disability: Dummary variable that equals 1 if the woman has a disability that 
  prevents work.   
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Appendix B.3 
 
Average Monthly Benefits in 1990 Dollars, by Program and State, for Selected Programs 
 
State AFDC-UP available in 
19901
AFDC + Food 
Stamps 
(family of 3) 
LIHEAP (household)  
FY 1990 
Alabama - 378 101 
Arizona - 551 138 
Arkansas - 464 96 
California x 832 69 
Colorado - 595 266 
Connecticut x 801 516 
Delaware x 579 321 
District of Columbia x 633 245 
Florida - 552 65 
Georgia - 533 179 
Hawaii x 940 180 
Illinois x 609 376 
Indiana  - 548 255 
Kansas  x 643 200 
Kentucky  - 488 109 
Louisiana  - 450 86 
Maryland  x 641 269 
Massachusetts  x 724 472 
Michigan  x 730 151 
Minnesota  x 719 371 
Mississippi  - 380 100 
Missouri x 549 199 
Nebraska x 601 215 
Nevada - 577 172 
New Hampshire - 700 383 
New Jersey x 651 400 
New Mexico - 524 158 
New York x 766 206 
North Carolina x 532 108 
Ohio x 584 107 
Oklahoma - 473 87 
Oregon x 684 185 
Pennsylvania x 641 219 
Rhode Island x 765 364 
South Carolina x 466 90 
Tennessee - 444 200 
Texas - 444 38 
Utah - 617 198 
Virginia - 594 270 
Washington x 714 214 
West Virginia x 509 113 
Wisconsin x 708 260 
 
1A value of 'x' signifies that AFDC-UP was available.
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Appendix C 
 
Intercorrelations of Variables: Whites 
                         Educ     Educ 
  |    Lone    Cohabit  Married    Age    Age Sq     <12     >12 
--------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Dependent Variables 
    Lone|   1.0000 
 Cohabit|  -0.1778   1.0000 
 Married|  -0.3762  -0.8449   1.0000 
    Person-level Independent Variables  
     Age|   0.0413  -0.3729   0.3286   1.0000 
  Age Sq|   0.0379  -0.3360   0.2957   0.9922   1.0000 
Educ <12|  -0.0658  0.0899  -0.0489  -0.0460  -0.0298   1.0000 
Educ >12|   0.1179  -0.0354  -0.0308   0.0040  -0.0105  -0.4360   1.0000 
Hispanic|  -0.0430  -0.0509   0.0789  -0.0496  -0.0481   0.2026  -0.1067 
Immigrnt|  -0.0313   0.0076   0.0099   0.0237   0.0230   0.1615  -0.0726 
   Rural|  -0.0982   0.1405  -0.0925   0.0519   0.0515   0.0426  -0.1273 
Pt Disab|   0.0230  -0.0259   0.0142   0.0434   0.0435   0.0324  -0.0240 
Tot Dsab|   0.0115  -0.0456   0.0418   0.0679   0.0709   0.1138  -0.0827 
         State-Level Independent Variables------------------------------ 
 AFDC+FS|   0.0103  -0.0739   0.0725   0.0001  -0.0017  -0.0432   0.0716 
 AFDC-UP|   0.0017  -0.0458   0.0476   0.0041   0.0034  -0.0467   0.0305 
Policy B|   0.0092  -0.0096   0.0049   0.0036   0.0032  -0.0179   0.0285 
Policy C|   0.0113  -0.0396   0.0356   0.0026   0.0027  -0.0096   0.0103 
Share In|   0.0128  -0.0337   0.0284  -0.0010  -0.0014  -0.0018   0.0180 
Unprd In|  -0.0077   0.0160  -0.0126  -0.0024  -0.0016   0.0034  -0.0278 
Gift Inc|  -0.0117   0.0224  -0.0170  -0.0064  -0.0068  -0.0005  -0.0031 
  LIHEAP|  -0.0007  -0.0185   0.0201   0.0057   0.0046  -0.0670   0.0367 
   Men U|   0.0048  -0.0287   0.0277  -0.0010  -0.0010   0.0060  -0.0093 
 Women U|   0.0004  -0.0101   0.0105  -0.0022  -0.0016   0.0548  -0.0261 
 U Ratio|   0.0080  -0.0245   0.0214   0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0580   0.0175 
%Svc Emp|   0.0205  -0.0795   0.0726   0.0005  -0.0003  -0.0297   0.0541 
 
       Immi-     Part    Total 
  | Hispanic    grant    Rural   Disab   Disab    AFDC+FS  AFDC-UP 
--------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hispanic|   1.0000 
Immigrnt|   0.4568   1.0000 
   Rural|  -0.1236  -0.1129   1.0000 
Pt Disab|  -0.0151  -0.0186   0.0014   1.0000 
Tot Disb|   0.0038  -0.0101   0.0111  -0.0258   1.0000 
         --------------------------------------------------------------- 
 AFDC+FS|   0.0740   0.1195  -0.1523   0.0039  -0.0046   1.0000 
 AFDC-UP|  -0.0266   0.0352  -0.0511   0.0001   0.0014   0.6624   1.0000 
Policy B|   0.0180   0.0087  -0.0480   0.0075  -0.0019  -0.0544  -0.2056 
Policy C|   0.0528   0.0559  -0.0225  -0.0066   0.0046   0.3152   0.1706 
Share In|   0.0746   0.0690  -0.0877   0.0018  -0.0026   0.2221   0.2076 
Unprd In|  -0.0450  -0.0312   0.0154   0.0034  -0.0027  -0.2642  -0.2486 
Gift Inc|  -0.0273  -0.0241  -0.0058   0.0050  -0.0062  -0.1415  -0.0213 
  LIHEAP|  -0.1017  -0.0421  -0.0085  -0.0008  -0.0136   0.2946   0.3337 
   Men U|   0.0554   0.0335  -0.0325   0.0030   0.0155   0.2810   0.2277 
 Women U|   0.1061   0.0516  -0.0123   0.0008   0.0203  -0.0499  -0.1748 
 U Ratio|  -0.0448  -0.0178  -0.0337   0.0044  -0.0038   0.4318   0.4850 
%Svc Emp|   0.1272   0.1276  -0.1971  -0.0037  -0.0073   0.4748   0.1593 
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Appendix C, cont’d 
 
 
  Policy  Policy   Share     Unpred    Gift        Men’s 
        |      B       C     Income    Income   Income  LIHEAP    U Rate 
--------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Policy B|   1.0000 
Policy C|  -0.1381   1.0000 
Share In|  -0.0253   0.1722   1.0000 
Unprd In|   0.2457  -0.1070  -0.0147   1.0000 
Gift Inc|   0.0260  -0.6943  -0.1203   0.1776   1.0000 
  LIHEAP|   0.0627   0.0933  -0.1380  -0.1140  -0.0486   1.0000 
   Men U|   0.0344   0.2126   0.0532  -0.1883  -0.1560  -0.0401   1.0000 
 Women U|  -0.0183   0.0714  -0.0562  -0.2289  -0.0651  -0.4273   0.7395 
 U Ratio|   0.0705   0.1880   0.1250  -0.0544  -0.0880   0.4531   0.5301 
%Svc Emp|   0.2397   0.3068   0.3180  -0.1203  -0.1806   0.2028   0.1934 
 
       Women’s   Unemp  Proportion 
        |   U Rate    Ratio  Svc Emp 
--------+--------------------------- 
 Women U|   1.0000 
 U Ratio|  -0.1527   1.0000 
%Svc Emp|   0.0102   0.2490   1.0000 
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Appendix C, cont’d 
 
Intercorrelations of Variables: Blacks 
 
             Educ    Educ 
        |    Lone    Cohabit  Married    Age    Age Sq     <12    >12 
--------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
   Dependent variables 
    Lone|   1.0000 
 Cohabit|  -0.3344   1.0000 
 Married|  -0.2305  -0.8400   1.0000 
    Person-level Independent Variables 
     Age|   0.0781  -0.2961   0.2608   1.0000 
  Age Sq|   0.0729  -0.2694   0.2362   0.9921   1.0000 
Educ <12|  -0.0605   0.1292  -0.0985   0.0130   0.0318   1.0000 
Educ >12|   0.1038  -0.1282   0.0726   0.0008  -0.0173  -0.4932   1.0000 
Hispanic|  -0.0100   0.0026   0.0031  -0.0113  -0.0125   0.0468  -0.0177 
Immigrnt|  -0.0204  -0.0347   0.0476   0.0114   0.0069   0.0230   0.0134 
   Rural|  -0.0664  -0.0307   0.0699   0.0041   0.0058   0.0598  -0.1021 
Pt Disab|   0.0100   0.0123  -0.0184   0.0642   0.0644   0.0302  -0.0229 
Tot Disb|   0.0196   0.0379  -0.0504   0.1177   0.1226   0.1384  -0.0979 
    State-level Independent Variables - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 AFDC+FS|   0.0298   0.0421  -0.0606   0.0133   0.0135  -0.0569   0.0737 
 AFDC-UP|   0.0218   0.0517  -0.0659   0.0156   0.0164  -0.0502   0.0420 
Policy B|   0.0042  -0.0139   0.0119  -0.0012  -0.0012   0.0249  -0.0068 
Policy C|   0.0001   0.0365  -0.0378   0.0093   0.0110   0.0107   0.0032 
Share In|   0.0172   0.0014  -0.0113   0.0084   0.0080  -0.0223   0.0194 
Unprd In|  -0.0029  -0.0198   0.0221   0.0036   0.0033   0.0266  -0.0361 
Gift Inc|  -0.0015  -0.0139   0.0153  -0.0047  -0.0053  -0.0142   0.0094 
  LIHEAP|   0.0063   0.0417  -0.0466   0.0097   0.0103  -0.0217   0.0186 
 Men’s U|   0.0021   0.0125  -0.0142  -0.0078  -0.0059   0.0269   0.0004 
 Women U|  -0.0055  -0.0227   0.0251  -0.0081  -0.0058   0.0346  -0.0153 
 U Ratio|   0.0334  -0.0776   0.0565   0.0206   0.0220  -0.0388   0.0460 
%Svc Emp|   0.0301   0.0397  -0.0584   0.0181   0.0184  -0.0248   0.0371 
 
       Immi-     Part    Total 
  | Hispanic    grant    Rural   Disab   Disab    AFDC+FS  AFDC-UP 
--------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hispanic|   1.0000 
Immigrnt|   0.2717   1.0000 
   Rural|  -0.0418  -0.0931   1.0000 
Pt Disab|  -0.0060  -0.0253  -0.0088   1.0000 
Tot Dsab|  -0.0043  -0.0380   0.0146  -0.0377   1.0000 
         --------------------------------------------------------------- 
 AFDC+FS|   0.1158   0.2047  -0.2842   0.0136  -0.0130   1.0000 
 AFDC-UP|   0.0618   0.0963  -0.1523   0.0124  -0.0076   0.6789   1.0000 
Policy B|   0.0210   0.1080  -0.0460   0.0037  -0.0095  -0.0344  -0.2602 
Policy C|   0.1605   0.3166  -0.1149  -0.0080  -0.0086   0.4384   0.2755 
Share In|   0.0442   0.1040  -0.0946   0.0067  -0.0113   0.2771   0.2990 
Unprd In|  -0.0319  -0.0166   0.0667  -0.0068  -0.0051  -0.1836  -0.1654 
Gift Inc|  -0.1070  -0.2135   0.0425   0.0102   0.0070  -0.2637  -0.0066 
  LIHEAP|   0.0375   0.0810  -0.1391   0.0044  -0.0216   0.3592   0.4050 
   Men U|   0.0273   0.0332  -0.2240   0.0132   0.0193   0.2388   0.2882 
 Women U|  -0.0261  -0.0868  -0.0097   0.0089   0.0337  -0.1287  -0.0785 
 U Ratio|   0.0769   0.1714  -0.3308   0.0091  -0.0128   0.5149   0.5307 
%Svc Emp|   0.1050   0.2376  -0.3042   0.0103  -0.0209   0.5887   0.2602 
 58
 
Appendix C, cont’d 
 
   Policy   Policy   Shared   Unpred   Gift   Men’s 
        |     B         C     Income   Income   Income  LIHEAP    U Rate 
--------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Policy B|   1.0000 
Policy C|  -0.1054   1.0000 
Share In|   0.1376   0.2239   1.0000 
Unprd In|   0.3819  -0.1698   0.0064   1.0000 
Gift Inc|   0.1000  -0.7395  -0.2771   0.2301   1.0000 
  LIHEAP|  -0.1028   0.1026  -0.0807  -0.1289  -0.0987   1.0000 
   Men U|  -0.1139   0.1506  -0.0917  -0.1303   0.0483   0.1865   1.0000 
 Women U|  -0.1029  -0.0776  -0.3461  -0.0843   0.1517  -0.1131   0.7641 
 U Ratio|  -0.0484   0.3356   0.2631  -0.1542  -0.0897   0.4333   0.5479 
%Svc Emp|   0.2725   0.3668   0.3380  -0.0699  -0.1571   0.2854   0.1331 
 
  Women’s  Men’s    Proportion 
        |   U Rate   U Rate   Svc Emp  
--------+--------------------------- 
 Women U|   1.0000 
 U Ratio|  -0.0910   1.0000 
%Svc Emp|  -0.2606   0.5710   1.0000 
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